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Abstract Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether1
explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better2
than William Rowe’s famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of3
these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because4
the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called “skepti-5
cal theists”. Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explanatory ver-6
sion that is “fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”.7
I argue that he has done no such thing.8
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Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explana-11
tory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than12
William Rowe’s famous versions of the evidential argument, for example.1 Some of13
these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because14
the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called “skeptical15
theists”.2 We might try to assess this claim in its full generality, but it will prove16
more fruitful, in my opinion, to assess each explanatory version to see whether it is17
better on this score. Elsewhere, I argue that Paul Draper’s explanatory version is not18
better.3 Here I argue for the same conclusion for another version, specifically Trent19
Dougherty’s, which lacks any premise according to which suffering is more likely or20
1 See Rowe (1979, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1996, 2003).
2 For example, Draper (1992), Draper and Dougherty (2013), and Dougherty (2014).
3 Howard-Snyder, unpublished.
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predictable on naturalism than theism, a fact about other explanatory versions that21
skeptical theists and their ilk have exploited.4 Indeed, not only does Dougherty’s ver-22
sion have no such premise, it is “fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining23
to skeptical theism”—or so he says. Is he right?24
Here’s the relevant passage:25
Given: The universe seems indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings.26
1. It is known that the hypothesis of indifference predicts the data of an appar-27
ently indifferent universe.28
2. It is unknown whether the hypothesis of theism predicts the data.29
3. The hypotheses have approximately equal prior probabilities [that is, equal30
chance of being true before considering observational evidence].31
4. Therefore, the data confirm the hypothesis of indifference and not the hypoth-32
esis of theism.33
Here is how the argument works. Imagine a pair of scales in which we are34
weighing evidence concerning theism and atheism. One side of the scales is35
labeled “Theism” and the other side is labeled “Hypothesis of Indifference.”36
Premise 3 says the scales are at first even. Premise 2 says that there is nothing37
to put on the scale marked “Theism.” Premise 1 says that there is something38
to put on the scale marked “Hypothesis of Indifference.” The conclusion says39
that after we have weighed the evidence, the scales tip to the side labeled40
“Hypothesis of Indifference.”41
Not only does this argument not make a noseeum inference, it doesn’t42
assign any probability at all to observed evils given theism. So this version43
seems to be fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical44
theism, except insofar as they can be brought to bear on premise 3.545
What should we make of this argument and its informal commentary? I’ll categorize46
my answer to this question under two headings: the data and the argument.47
But first a remark about “the Hypothesis of Indifference” (HI). Dougherty never tells48
us what it is. Many of us, however, will recognize it from Draper’s work, where it is used49
to refer to the hypothesis that “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings50
on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman51
persons”.6 Presumably Dougherty has the same thing in mind.52
The data53
We are told that it is “given” that “The universe seems indifferent to the suffering of54
sentient beings.” What does that mean? We can give this sentence a de re reading55
and a de dicto reading. On the de re reading, there is an x such that x is numerically56
identical with the universe and x has the property of seeming indifferent to the suffer-57
ing of sentient beings. On the de dicto reading, there is a proposition, the proposition58
4 See, e.g., Bergmann (2009) and Howard-Snyder, unpublished.
5 Dougherty (2014, Sect. 6.3).
6 Draper (1989, p. 13).
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that the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings, and that proposition59
has the property of seeming to be true. My purposes will be served on either reading60
since what I have to say can be said about both, mutatis mutandis. I choose the de61
dicto reading. Notice that, on the de dicto reading, we are told that what’s “given”62
as our “data” is that (i) there is a certain proposition—the proposition that the uni-63
verse is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings—and (ii) that proposition has64
the property of seeming to be true. Call this conjunction the data proposition and65
call the proposition brought to our attention in the first conjunct the core proposi-66
tion.67
Now focus on the core proposition, the proposition that the universe is indifferent68
to the suffering of sentient beings. Notice two things about it. First, it presupposes that69
there is something that answers to “the universe” and, second, it attributes a mental70
state to it, the state of indifference. Some of us, impressed by the unsettled state of71
theorizing about the metaphysics of parts and wholes, might well wonder whether72
there is anything that answers to “the universe”. But even those of us who have no73
such qualms will insist that it is unwise to ascribe a mental state to the universe. After74
all, the universe is an inanimate object and, as a matter of necessity, inanimate objects75
lack mental states. Taken strictly and literally, it’s going to be a hard sell that the core76
proposition has the property of seeming to be true.77
Diagnosis Dougherty is speaking metaphorically. He doesn’t really mean to draw78
our attention to the proposition that there is a universe that has a certain mental state,79
the state of indifference. What he means to draw our attention to is a proposition80
that is much less contentious, e.g., that sentient beings on earth suffer in a variety of81
ways without need or benefit, or something like that. Although this is a significant82
improvement, in what follows I will use the proffered metaphorical expression of the83
core proposition.84
So we have the core proposition and a claim about it: that it seems to be true, that it85
has the property of seeming to be true. Here we need to slow down. Do we really want86
to say that the core proposition has the property of seeming to be true? How could87
we tell such a thing? More importantly, what is that property, the property of seeming88
to be true, which the proponent of the argument—call her Athea—says that the core89
proposition has?90
Here we would do well to remember that there’s a world of difference between91
saying something of the form “p seems to me to be true” or “it seems to me that p” and92
saying something of the form “p seems to be true” or “it seems that p”. Whether any93
particular utterance by me of the former pair is true is a matter of how things stand94
with respect to me, e.g., whether I am in a seeming state toward p when I consider95
it. Whether any particular utterance of the latter pair is true, however, is not a matter96
of how things stand with respect to me (or you, for that matter). Rather, it is more97
a matter of how things stand with respect to p itself. We meet a peculiar resident at98
the local psychiatric ward who claims to be Cleopatra. No doubt it seems to her that99
she is Cleopatra, no doubt that proposition seems to be true to her. But should we100
infer that the proposition that she is Cleopatra, the proposition itself, thereby has the101
property of seeming to be true? Surely not. The same goes for Athea. The proposition102
that the universe is indifferent seems to her to be true. But it hardly follows that that103
proposition has the property of seeming to be true. If ever there was a fallacy, the104
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overreaching seemer’s fallacy is one: “p seems to me to be true, so p seems to be true”105
or “it seems to me that p, so it seems that p”. So what is this property of p, the property106
of its seeming that p, if it isn’t the property of its seeming to me that p?107
Although simpliciter seemingness isn’t the same property as to-me-seemingness, as108
we might call them, presumably the former is not completely unrelated to the seeming109
states of such persons as there may be. Suppose there were no persons, and so there110
was no one with respect to which any proposition seemed any way. In that case, would111
some proposition still seem to be true, would some proposition have the property of112
simpliciter seemingness? I suspect not. If that’s right, then whether or not a proposition113
p has that property is not completely a matter of how things stand with respect to p114
itself, without reference to the seeming states of anyone.115
Are there any propositions that paradigmatically count as having the property of116
simpliciter seemingness? Consider the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4, or the proposition117
that everything red is colored, or the conditional corresponding to modus tollens. If118
any proposition has the property of simpliciter seemingness, the property of seeming119
to be true, these do. So then, suppose they do, and suppose their having simpliciter120
seemingness is a matter of their seeming true to some people or other.121
But which people? That’s a surprisingly difficult question to answer. In virtue of122
which people, and what proportion of them, is any particular proposition such that123
it—the proposition itself—has the property of seeming to be true, the property of124
simpliciter seemingness? Call this the “reference class problem”.125
Let’s think very briefly about some solutions. They fall into two mutually exclu-126
sive and jointly exhaustive classes: (i) the property a proposition has when it seems127
simpliciter to be true is identical with or otherwise closely related to the property of128
its seeming to be true to everyone who considers it, and (ii) the property a proposition129
has when it seems simpliciter to be true is identical with or otherwise closely related130
to the property of its seeming to be true to some but not all people who consider it.131
The problem with the everyone solution, as we might call it, is that it’s false. Some132
people who consider at least some of our paradigms are just, well, screwed up. There’s133
no nice way to put it. Either they don’t understand them when they consider them or they134
understand them but they “just don’t get it,” as they say. More importantly for present135
purposes, even if our paradigms were such that they seemed to be true to everyone136
who considered them, that wouldn’t help Athea. That’s because it is false that the core137
proposition—the proposition that the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient138
beings—seems to be true to everyone who considers it. For example, it doesn’t seem139
to be true to me when I consider it. And I’m not alone. It doesn’t seem to be true to140
many people when they consider it, especially many students of the problem of evil.141
So on the everyone solution to the reference class problem, the data proposition is142
false.143
What about the alternative, the some-but-not-all-people solution? The problem with144
it is that it is enormously difficult to say which people, and what proportion of them,145
count, and to say so in a way that does not smack of arbitrariness. We can see this146
especially in the case we are concerned with. Athea must specify just which people147
count, and which don’t, and explain why her specification is correct. Of course, it148
would be arbitrary in the extreme for her to answer that the only people who count are149
those to whom the core proposition in fact seems to be true. So there must be some150
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other way, some non-arbitrary way to identify a population whose seeming states are151
the relevant ones, relevant to the question of how we are to understand what, exactly,152
this property of simpliciter seemingness is supposed to be. Has anyone discovered153
such a way? Of course not. Any such population is a pipedream. But just to pursue154
the matter a little further, suppose we do find some non-arbitrary way to identify our155
pipedream population, and suppose we poll them for the seemers and the no-seemers.156
(Note well: the no-seemers need not be those to whom the core proposition seems157
false. I would think that, typically, the no-seemers will be those who lack a pro-158
seeming state when they consider the core proposition, which is not the same thing as159
its seeming to them that it’s false.) Suppose the seemers achieve a simple majority—by160
one. Well then, on the principle that a simple majority wins, the core proposition—the161
proposition that the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings—has the162
property of simpliciter seemingness: it seems to be true. But now imagine that two of163
the seemers die in an auto accident. Then the no-seemers have a majority by one. Has164
the core proposition just lost the property of simpliciter seemingness? Or imagine that165
whenever the no-seemers discover that the seemers have a majority, they knock off166
just enough seemers to make the core proposition lose that property. Does the core167
proposition keep gaining and losing the property of simpliciter seemingness? Perhaps168
the simple majority principle isn’t the right one. Perhaps there’s another principle, for169
example the two-thirds majority principle. But why prefer it? For that matter, why170
prefer any of them? Doesn’t it all seem just a little…arbitrary? More importantly, is171
this really the sort of reflection and concern that Dougherty wants us to bring to a172
consideration of the data of his explanatory version of the evidential argument from173
evil?174
Of course, it might be that when Athea informs us that “The universe seems indif-175
ferent to the suffering of sentient beings” she means to say neither more nor less than176
that “The universe seems to me—Athea—to be indifferent to the suffering of sentient177
being”. Suppose that’s true. Then we have an explanatory version of the argument from178
evil for atheism that takes as its datum, as what’s “given,” that it seems to Athea that the179
universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings, that the core proposition—180
that the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings—has the property of181
seeming to be true to Athea. While some people may find this datum to be compelling182
evidence to think that there is no God, I have a difficult time getting jazzed up about it.183
Upshot Athea informs us that it is “given” that “The universe seems indifferent to184
the suffering of sentient beings”. However, it’s difficult to know what she’s proposing185
as “given”. It can’t be that it seems that an inanimate object, the universe, has a mental186
state, the state of indifference. But when we turn to something less contentious, we’re187
left with the overreaching seemer’s fallacy or the reference class problem or something188
of relatively little interest. So what’s the “data”? What’s “given”?189
Of course, if what’s given is simply the core proposition—i.e., the proposition that190
the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings—and not the additional191
claim that that proposition seems to be true, then we won’t have any difficulties of the192
sort I’ve just been surveying. But if we go this route, then it becomes very important193
to know what non-metaphorical proposition, exactly, is “given”. If it is the proposition194
that sentient beings on earth suffer in a variety of ways without need or benefit, we195
might well wish to ask “Without need for what? And, without benefit for whom?”196
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If the answer is “Without need for anyone’s good, and without benefit to anyone,”197
we might well then ask, “Why do you suppose that sentient beings on earth suffer198
in a variety of ways without need for anyone’s good or benefit to anyone?” If the199
answer is “Because we can’t think of any good for which it is needed and we can’t200
think of any benefit for anyone,” then we will not have been given an argument that is201
“fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”.202
I propose to pretend in what follows that we know what data is given. Now let’s203
inspect the argument itself, with Dougherty’s claim in mind: that the argument he204
states is “fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”.205
(The qualification “except insofar as they can be brought to bear on premise 3” need206
not concern us.)207
The argument208
There are three points to make about Dougherty’s argument in relation to his claim.209
First, (4) does not follow from premises (1) to (3). According to Athea, the data210
confirm HI but not theism since, given equal priors, it is known that HI predicts the211
data and it is unknown whether theism predicts it. That’s a non-sequitur. At best, all212
that follows is213
4′. The data confirm HI and it is unknown whether the data confirm theism.214
Notably, at least some of those who are attuned to “considerations pertaining to skep-215
tical theism” will warmly embrace (4′). Indeed, this is exactly the sort of thing the216
skeptical theist might say, not to mention her friends the skeptical atheist and the217
skeptical agnostic.218
In order to avoid the non-sequitur and the warmly embracable (4′), we must add a219
premise to Dougherty’s argument. Perhaps this will do: it is known that theism does220
not predict the data. Or perhaps this: theism does not predict the data. I’m not sure221
which to add, but add we must lest our interest in Dougherty’s argument turns to dust.222
Let’s mention both of them and leave it up to Athea which she would prefer:223
2.5 (It is known that) theism does not predict the data.224
Second, in the first paragraph of the informal commentary Dougherty uses the scale225
metaphor to tell us “how the argument works”. There we read this sentence: “Premise226
2 says that there is nothing to put on the scale marked ‘Theism.”’ This sentence is227
false. That’s because premise (2) in the argument states “2. It is unknown whether the228
hypothesis of theism predicts the data” and, if we aim to translate (2) into the terms229
of the scale metaphor, we should say “Premise (2) says that it is unknown whether230
there is anything to put on the scale marked ‘Theism’,” and not what Dougherty says.231
Of course, when we dwell a moment on this better translation of premise (2), we will232
want to ask “Unknown to whom?,” the answer to which can only be “us,” in which case233
the best translation of (2) in the terms of the scale metaphor is “It is unknown to us234
whether there is anything to put on the scale marked ‘Theism”’. Now, I submit that it’s235
pretty close to obvious that the way to translate premise (2) of Dougherty’s argument is236
not “There is nothing to put on the scale marked ‘Theism”’ but rather “It is unknown237
to us whether there is anything to put on the scale marked ‘Theism”’. How could238
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someone confuse the former for the latter? Well, if one were unconsciously drawing239
the inference “It is unknown to us whether there is anything to put on the scale marked240
‘Theism’; therefore, there is nothing to put on the scale marked ‘Theism’,” one might241
engage in that confusion. Indeed, it’s difficult not to see in the informal commentary an242
implicit noseeum inference like this. And, as everyone knows, noseeum inferences—243
whether explicit or implicit—are hardly “fundamentally immune to considerations244
pertaining to skeptical theism”.245
Third, if there is a noseeum inference implicit in Dougherty’s informal commentary,246
we might well expect to find one implicit in the argument itself, or something close247
enough to one so as not to be “fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining248
to skeptical theism”. Is our expectation well-founded? Well, the argument explicitly249
contains this premise:250
2. It is unknown [to us] whether the hypothesis of theism predicts the data.251
And, as we’ve seen, the argument is a non-sequitur unless we charitably add premise252
(2.5):253
2.5 (It is known that) the hypothesis of theism does not predict the data.254
Once we exercise charity, however, we might well ask how these two premises are255
related to each other. Do they just show up in the argument side-by-side, having nothing256
to do with each other? Surely not. Surely the thrust of thought here requires a closer257
connection than that. Surely it requires that the latter is inferred from the former. Thus,258
a more perspicuous expression of Dougherty’s explanatory version of the evidential259
argument from evil goes as follows:260
1. It is known that HI predicts the data of an apparently indifferent universe.261
2. It is unknown [to us] whether theism predicts the data.262
2.5 Therefore, (it is known that) theism does not predict the data. (2.5)263
3. The hypotheses have approximately equal prior probabilities.264
4. Therefore, the data confirm HI and not theism. (1, 2.5, 3)265
And, clearly enough, the inference from (2) to (2.5) is not “fundamentally immune to266
considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”.267
After all, one might well wonder on the basis of considerations pertaining to skep-268
tical theism whether, grounds for belief in God aside, it would be unknown to us269
whether theism predicts the data or exactly how it predicts the data, if it did predict it.270
Moreover, one might well wonder on the basis of considerations pertaining to skep-271
tical theism whether (i) the move from “Theism has the property of being unknown272
by us to predict the data” to “Theism has the property of not predicting the data” is273
reasonable, or whether (ii) the move from “Theism has the property of being unknown274
by us to predict the data” to “Theism has the property of being known by us not to275
predict the data” is reasonable. Furthermore, one might well point out that theism does276
not predict that the universe seems indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings only277
if there is no good or other reason that would justify God in permitting the universe to278
seem indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings—an obvious implication that we279
must not be in doubt about if we are to reasonably infer that theism does not predict280
the data. In that case, one might naturally wonder why we should believe that there is281
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no such good or other reason. The fact that the argument or its informal commentary282
already invites us to move easily from the unknown to the known strongly suggests283
that lurking here is another such invitation, to move easily from “we don’t know of284
any such good or other reason” to “there is no such good or reason”—which is hardly285
“fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”.286
It may well be that one day someone will come up with an explanatory version of287
the evidential argument from evil that is “fundamentally immune to considerations288
pertaining to skeptical theism”. This much is clear, however: if Dougherty’s argument289
is any indication of the prospects for such an argument, that day is a long way off.7290
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